Sam's Court Opinion Monitor Friday, October 23, 2026

Today: 1 new Fourth Circuit opinion, 4 new NC Supreme Court opinions, 1 new NC Business Court opinion

N.C. Super. Ct.: Contract clause naming Delaware as place of formation defeats North Carolina’s anti-forum-selection statute — Iqvia Holdings Inc. v. Panagos N.C.: Bankruptcy stay pauses North Carolina’s ten-year clock for renewing civil judgments — E. Bay Co. v. Baxley, 4th Cir.: Fourth Circuit upholds Army Corps wetlands permit for large Charleston-area development — South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

IN THIS ISSUE South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (4th Cir.) — Section 404 wetlands permit, LEDPA alternatives analysis E. Bay Co. v. Baxley, (N.C.) — bankruptcy stay tolling judgment renewal deadline State v. Latta, (N.C.) — Plea agreement breach; failure to appear for sentencing State v. Montanino, (N.C.) — Felony murder conviction; sufficiency of value evidence for larceny Mayer v. Goldner, (N.C.) — derivative suit, motion to dismiss Iqvia Holdings Inc. v. Panagos (N.C. Super. Ct.) — forum-selection clause, place-of-formation drafting, § 22B-3

FOURTH CIRCUIT — 1 new opinion

South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (4th Cir.) No. 25-1797 • Published Before Judges Agee and Berner, Circuit Judges Opinion by Judge Thacker • Unanimous Affirmed Appeal from D.S.C. (Judge Gergel) Environmental Real Estate Civil Procedure The Fourth Circuit held that challenges to a final Section 404 permit decision arise under the APA rather than the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision, and that the Corps' least-environmentally-damaging-practicable-alternative determination was not arbitrary or capricious. Core Legal Issues: Whether jurisdiction over a Section 404 permit challenge lies under the CWA citizen suit provision or the APA, and whether the Corps' LEDPA determination was arbitrary and capricious. Key Facts: The Corps permitted a 3,906-acre mixed-use development at Cainhoy Plantation affecting 181.5 wetlands acres, down from an initial 1,820 acres. Its environmental assessment reviewed nine off-site alternatives, four on-site alternatives, a conservation group’s plan, and no action. Holding and Reasoning: Because the challenge targets final agency action, the APA supplies jurisdiction; Hanson reaches only nondiscretionary-duty claims. The error was harmless given the identical standard of review. The Corps tied each rejected alternative to the project’s overall purpose or greater wetlands impact, supplying the required rational connection. KEY TAKEAWAY Plead Section 404 permit challenges under the APA, not the citizen suit provision, and attack the agency’s stated project purpose early — once the Corps defines purpose broadly and documents alternatives, deference largely forecloses the merits. See Also: Kustra v. Griffing — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Real Estate) Pallen v. Wingfield — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 7, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Real Estate) Alston v. Millennia Hous. Dev., Ltd. — N.C. Ct. App., Sept. 16, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Real Estate) Counsel: Appellants South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, Charleston Waterkeeper, and South Carolina Wildlife Federation: Catherine Moore Wannamaker, Christopher K. DeScherer & Emily C. Wyche (Southern Environmental Law Center) Federal Appellees: Jacob David Ecker, Adam R.F. Gustafson, Rebecca Jaffe & Kristen Sarna (U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division) Intervenor Appellees: Michael Rhett DeHart (Adams & Reese LLP) View Full Opinion →

NC SUPREME COURT — 4 new opinions

E. Bay Co. v. Baxley, (N.C. Oct. 23, 2026) No. 40PA25 • Oct. 23, 2026 Before Unanimous opinion of the Court; no separate writings, Justices Opinion by Justice Allen • Unanimous Reversed and remanded. Appeal from Court of Appeals (unanimous), affirming Wake County Superior Court (Judge Gregory) dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Commercial Litigation Banking Civil Procedure The Court held that the automatic bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is a “statutory prohibition” under N.C.G.S. § 1-23, tolling the ten-year limitations period for judgment renewal actions. Issue: Whether a debtor’s automatic bankruptcy stay tolls the ten-year limitations period for renewing a civil judgment under N.C.G.S. § 1-47(1). Key Facts: East Bay obtained a 2010 judgment. Baxley’s Chapter 7 petition stayed collection for 711 days until discharge was denied. East Bay filed its renewal action after ten years had run but within the stay-extended window it claimed. Holding and Reasoning: Because § 362(a) is a blanket ban on suing the debtor, it is a “statutory prohibition” that tolls the clock under § 1-23. Section 108(c) sets a thirty-day floor, not a ceiling, and incorporates longer state tolling periods. The Court distinguished Fisher and Gilmore as involving no alleged stay. KEY TAKEAWAY Creditors holding North Carolina judgments can now add the full duration of any bankruptcy stay to the ten-year renewal deadline rather than relying on § 108(c)'s thirty-day grace period, so recalculate renewal dates on any judgment interrupted by a debtor’s bankruptcy. See Also: Kustra v. Griffing — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Commercial Litigation) ESTEVEZ v. C&S COM., LLC, 2026 NCBC ORDER 80 — N.C. Super. Ct., Oct. 16, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Commercial Litigation) CHERRY v. MAUCK, 2026 NCBC ORDER 79 — N.C. Super. Ct., Oct. 15, 2026 (shared: Banking, Commercial Litigation) Counsel: Plaintiff-appellant East Bay Company, Ltd.: Matthew W. Buckmiller & Joseph Z. Frost (Buckmiller & Frost, PLLC) Defendant-appellee Brandon Scott Baxley: William H. Kroll (Gaskins Hancock Tuttle Hash LLP) View Full Opinion →

State v. Latta, (N.C. Oct. 23, 2026) No. 139PA25 • Oct. 23, 2026 Opinion by Judge Trey Allen Criminal Contract Civil Procedure Bottom Line North Carolina Supreme Court holds defendant cannot withdraw guilty plea after twenty-year absence. Holding The North Carolina Supreme Court held that a defendant who flees and fails to appear for sentencing breaches an implicit condition of his plea agreement, thereby forfeiting any right under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1024 to withdraw the guilty plea when a different sentence is imposed due to intervening criminal convictions. Author Justice Allen Lineup Justice Allen delivered the opinion. No separate opinions noted; disposition indicates unanimous decision. Disposition Unanimous, reversed. Appeal from North Carolina Court of Appeals, 299 N.C. App. 103 (2025); Superior Court, Durham County (Judge Michael J. O’Foghludha). Key Facts Defendant pled guilty in June 2002 to three counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, two attempted robbery charges, and one count of second-degree kidnapping pursuant to a plea agreement capping his sentence at 61–83 months. After posting bond, he fled North Carolina and did not appear for sentencing in November 2002. Nearly twenty years later, after arrest in another state, defendant faced sentencing with a significantly higher prior record level (PRL IV instead of PRL I) due to intervening out-of-state convictions. The trial court sentenced him consistent with his current PRL under the Structured Sentencing Act, imposing 71–95 months. Holding and Reasoning Defendant argued N.C.G.S. § 15A-1024 mandated withdrawal of his plea because the trial court imposed a sentence different from the agreement. The Court rejected this, holding that defendant’s failure to appear for sentencing breached an implicit condition of the plea agreement. The Court drew on United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 1995), recognizing that every plea agreement contains an implicit obligation to appear for sentencing. Because defendant breached that term by fleeing while on bond, the State’s obligation to honor the agreed sentence was discharged. The Court distinguished State v. Wall and State v. Ellis, where defendants had complied with all plea obligations but faced legally impossible sentences; here, defendant’s own post-plea criminal conduct raised his PRL, making the original sentence unlawful under § 15A-1340.13. Allowing withdrawal would permit defendant to evade responsibility by leveraging his subsequent crimes and force the State to retry twenty-five-year-old charges against witnesses who had died or become unavailable. Key Takeaway Practitioners defending criminal clients should note that courts now view appearance for sentencing as an implicit, non-waivable condition of plea agreements; absconding after pleading guilty extinguishes the defendant’s contractual protections and exposes the client to sentencing on a blank slate under current guidelines. For prosecutors, this opinion clarifies that a defendant’s post-plea criminal conduct breaking his PRL does not trigger statutory withdrawal rights when the defendant himself caused the changed circumstances through breach. Open Questions The opinion flags but does not resolve an apparent conflict between N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.13 (mandatory PRL-based sentencing) and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1024 (right to withdraw when sentencing deviates from plea agreement)—though the Court sidesteps this by grounding its holding on breach rather than statutory conflict. See Also: State v. Miner — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Criminal) ESTEVEZ v. C&S COM., LLC, 2026 NCBC 80 — N.C. Super. Ct., Oct. 19, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Contract) SONG v. PROBST, 2026 NCBC ORDER 78 — N.C. Super. Ct., Oct. 14, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Contract) Counsel State: Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, by Arneatha James, Special Deputy Attorney General Defendant-Appellee: Darren Jackson View Full Opinion →

State v. Montanino, (N.C. Oct. 23, 2026) No. 165A24 • Oct. 23, 2026 Opinion by Judge Tamara Barringer Criminal Evidence Appellate Bottom Line North Carolina Supreme Court upholds murder conviction where jury inferred vehicle value without direct proof. Author Justice Barringer Lineup Barringer, joined by Chief Justice Newby and Justices Allen and Dietz. Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Berger. Concurring: Riggs, joined by Earls. Disposition Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 4 justices joining the main holding on sufficiency of value; Berger and Riggs concurred in part. Appeal From Court of Appeals, 294 N.C. App. 240 (2024), reversing Superior Court conviction and remanding. Core Legal Issues Whether the trial court plainly erred in failing to include an explicit “not guilty” option on the jury verdict sheet for first-degree murder, and whether the State presented sufficient evidence of the stolen vehicle’s value to support the felony larceny charge underlying a felony murder conviction. Key Facts Montanino was charged with first-degree murder in the beating death of Elizabeth Watson. Law enforcement discovered Watson’s body in her apartment, Montanino’s fingerprints throughout the residence, Watson’s blood on his shorts, and Watson’s 2012 Suzuki SUV missing from her parking lot. Montanino was found in Chapel Hill with the vehicle. The trial court charged the jury on first-degree murder under both the traditional theory (malice, premeditation, deliberation) and the felony murder rule, using larceny of the SUV as the underlying felony. Holding and Reasoning The Court held that the trial court did not plainly err under the exacting standard articulated in State v. Reber. The jury instruction—stating that if jurors were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, they would “not return a verdict of guilty”—combined with the verdict sheet’s binary questions, adequately conveyed that acquittal was an option. The jury’s “No” answer to the malice/premeditation theory demonstrated understanding. The Court also held that direct evidence of value is not required when property is so ubiquitous that jurors can determine value exceeds the statutory threshold using common knowledge. A 2012 Suzuki SUV, described as operable and in good condition, falls within this category given motor vehicles' prominence in everyday life. The $1,000 felony larceny threshold was thus sufficiently proven. Separate Opinions Berger (concurring in part, dissenting in part): Berger disagreed with the majority’s assumption that plain error review can extend to verdict sheets. Berger argued that plain error review is confined to “unpreserved instructional and evidentiary error” and that a verdict sheet is neither. Berger contended the majority, by “assuming without deciding” that verdict sheets qualify for plain error review, issued an advisory opinion that will unsettle the narrower rule established in Reber and invite litigants to reframe unpreserved arguments. Berger criticized the majority for declining to definitively resolve whether verdict sheets fall within plain error review, warning that the ambiguity signals an expansion of the doctrine that contradicts the requirement that plain error be applied “cautiously and only in the exceptional case.” Riggs (concurring, joined by Earls): Riggs agreed with both holdings but emphasized the narrowness of the sufficiency-of-value rule. Riggs cautioned that direct evidence of value will be required in most cases and that the State still bears the burden of proving value. Riggs highlighted State v. Mitchell, which held that a jury could not infer marijuana weight without direct evidence because such weight is not a matter of common knowledge, contrasting it with State v. Barnes, permitting age inference. Riggs warned against overapplication of the rule, noting that not all property items are ubiquitous enough for juries to infer value reliably, and outlined a hypothetical (stolen catalytic converter) where the ubiquity rule would not support a presumption of value. Key Takeaway The holding on vehicle value is narrow and fact-specific: direct value evidence is not required only when jurors can reliably infer value from everyday experience and the property’s ubiquity—typically confined to intact, operable vehicles. The State must still present concrete circumstantial evidence (condition, operability, make/model, year) and remains responsible for proving the value element; courts and the State should not treat this as license to elide value evidence in other property crimes. Open Questions The majority’s assumption that verdict sheets may receive plain error review if they “contain language reinforcing an erroneous jury instruction” leaves unresolved whether verdict sheets are reviewable under plain error at all when jury instructions are not themselves erroneous—a gap Berger identified as likely to generate confusion in lower courts and on remand. Why This Matters This opinion directly affects how prosecutors must present evidence in felony larceny prosecutions and how defense counsel should challenge sufficiency; it also signals tension within the Court over the proper scope of plain error review, which has broad implications for appellate strategy in criminal cases involving unpreserved errors. See Also: State v. Harmon — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Appellate, Criminal) State v. Plummer — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Appellate, Criminal) State v. Tyson — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Appellate, Criminal) Counsel State of North Carolina: Robert C. Ennis, Special Deputy Attorney General (Attorney General’s Office) Defendant Philip Anthony Montanino: Ryan Christopher Kuchinski View Full Opinion →

Mayer v. Goldner, (N.C. Oct. 23, 2026) No. 17A26 • Oct. 23, 2026 Before Opinion issued per curiam; no separate opinions or dissents noted in the text, Justices Opinion by Per Curiam • Unanimous Affirmed. Business Organizations Insurance Civil Procedure The Court affirmed the Business Court’s order denying a third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss, without issuing independent reasoning. Issue: Whether the Business Court erred in denying a third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss. Key Facts: Mayer brought derivative and individual claims against Goldner over Sherbrooke Corporate Ltd. Goldner and Sherbrooke then filed third-party claims against several individuals and entities, including insurance agencies Grand Hook Agency (Tricura) and Helios Risk Solutions. The Business Court denied one third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss, prompting this interlocutory appeal. Holding and Reasoning: The Court affirmed in a one-word per curiam disposition, without stating independent reasoning. The opinion incorporates the Business Court’s underlying order (2025 NCBC 59) by reference. KEY TAKEAWAY Because the Court issued no reasoning, practitioners should look to the Business Court’s underlying opinion (2025 NCBC 59) for any substantive guidance on the motion-to-dismiss standards applied to third-party insurance-related claims. See Also: Eagles v. Discovery Ins. Co. — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Business Organizations, Civil Procedure, Insurance) Brinkley v. MJM Wildlife, LLC — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Business Organizations, Civil Procedure) ESTEVEZ v. C&S COM., LLC, 2026 NCBC 80 — N.C. Super. Ct., Oct. 19, 2026 (shared: Business Organizations, Civil Procedure) Counsel: Third-party plaintiff-respondents: Abigail A. Golden & T. Richmond McPherson III (Bowman and Brooke LLP) Third-party defendant-appellant: Christopher Pey View Full Opinion →

NC BUSINESS COURT — 1 new opinion

Iqvia Holdings Inc. v. Panagos, 2026 NCBC 81 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2026) No. 26-CVS-9791 • Oct. 23, 2026 Chief Judge Conrad • Motion to dismiss for improper venue granted; amended complaint dismissed without prejudice; motion for preliminary injunction denied as moot. Commercial Litigation Employment Civil Procedure The court held that N.C.G.S. § 22B-3 did not void the Delaware forum-selection clauses because the agreements expressly stated they were made and entered into in Delaware, and dismissed the entire action for improper venue. Core Legal Issue and Posture Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue, plus IQVIA’s motion to enjoin a former executive’s competition. Key Facts IQVIA sued four departed executives and competitor Syneos over restrictive covenants. The executives' confidentiality agreements contained Delaware choice-of-law, exclusive Delaware forum-selection, and place-of-formation clauses. Holding and Reasoning Because the agreements recited Delaware as the place of formation, § 22B-3 — limited to contracts entered into in North Carolina — did not apply, and contrary allegations yielded to the contract text. The “I further agree” phrasing bound both sides, not just employees. Designating the case to Business Court waived nothing. Syneos, a nonsignatory, could enforce the clauses because every claim against it depended on the agreements. Key Takeaway Add an express place-of-formation clause when drafting out-of-state forum selection into North Carolina employment and commercial agreements; conversely, plaintiffs seeking a North Carolina forum should check for that language before relying on § 22B-3. See Also: BROWN v. TM NORTHLAKE MALL, LP, 2026 NCBC 77 — N.C. Super. Ct., Sept. 10, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Commercial Litigation) Kustra v. Griffing — N.C. Ct. App., Oct. 21, 2026 (shared: Civil Procedure, Commercial Litigation) John Doe v. Catholic Relief Services — 4th Cir. (shared: Civil Procedure, Employment) Counsel: Plaintiffs IQVIA Holdings Inc. and IQVIA RDS, Inc.: David Klass & Daniel F. Lanciloti (Fisher & Phillips, LLP) Defendants Costa Panagos, Simon Bartle, Jonathan Limbouris, Jan Lotriet, and Syneos Health, Inc.: Adam Doerr & Stephen D. Feldman (Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.); Andrew Ditchfield (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP) View Full Opinion →

Sam's Court Opinion Monitor • Issue #129 This digest is generated for informational use and does not constitute legal advice. Summaries are generated by AI and may contain errors. Always refer to the full opinion for authoritative text. Sam's Court Opinion Monitor tracks new published opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit, N.C. Supreme Court, N.C. Court of Appeals, and N.C. Business Court, as well as N.C. Business Court orders of significance. Each opinion is automatically downloaded, summarized by AI, and delivered in this formatted digest on weekday afternoons. Opinions are ranked by practice-area relevance, doctrinal significance, and practical impact. Subscribe to This Digest